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Abstract
To what extent, hiring incentives targeting a specific group of vulnerable unem-
ployed (i.e. long-term-unemployed) are more effective, with respect to generalised
incentives (without a definite target), to increase hirings of the targeted group? Are
generalized incentives able to influence hirings of the vulnerable group? Do targeted
policies have negative side effects too important to accept them? Even though there
is a huge literature on hiring subsidies, these questions remained unresolved. We
tried to answer them, comparing the impact of two similar hiring policies, one ori-
ented towards a target group and one generalised, implemented on the italian labour
market. We used administrative data on job contracts, and counterfactual analysis
methods. The targeted policy had a positive and significant impact, while the gen-
eralized policy didn’t have a significant impact on the vulnerable group. Moreover,
we concluded the targeted policy didn’t have any indirect negative side effect.
Key-words: long-term unemployed, active labour market policies, regression dis-
continuity design.
1 Introduction
In spite of the huge amount of international literature on hiring and wage subsidies,
targeting a vulnerable category of unemployed (i.e. long-term-unemployed), few is
known about the difference between the last and generalised subsidies without a
definite target. Moreover, few is known about the mechanism behind them and
their indirect effects. Additional informations on the difference between the two
policies would, nontheless, be extremely useful. Indeed, it is important to know
which of the two policies would be more effective and whether the vulnerable group
would be penalised by a switch from the targeted to the untargeted ones. Equally,
it would be useful to have more informations on their possible indirect effects, which
may affect their effectiveness. Our study tries to overcome this lack of informations.
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2We estimated the impacts of a targeted policy, and a generalised one with similar
characteristics, from the targeted group perspective. Later on, we compared them.
Both of the policies were implemented in Italy. The first policy is Law 407/90.
According to Brown and Koettl (2012) classification, it was an incentive to create
(permanent) employment targeting long-term unemployed. It was implemented
from 1990 to the end of 2014. It was widely used by firms. The second policy
is 2015 Legge Stabilita` (or Law 190). It consisted, among others, in incentives to
create permanent employment without a particular targeted group. It lasted one
year. It implied the permanent end of Law 407/90.
There are no empirical studies comparing targeted and generalised subsidies.
Nevertheless, Brown (2015) did a meta-analysis trying to identify the positive and
negative consequences of both types of policies. The author underlined as targeted
hiring subsidies have lower deadweigth costs1 with respect to untargeted ones. Nev-
ertheless, he stated that targeted subsidies may have negative consequences at a
macroeconomic level. Indeed, in presence of the subsidy, firms may hire subsidised
unemployed instead of unsubsidised ones with similar characteristics (and, conse-
quently, a similar vulnerability level), penalising the last. This indirect effect is
called displacement effect. Moreover, when eligibility is defined by determined con-
ditions (as in tagreted policies), the presence of asymmetric informations on Gov-
ernment’s side may induce agents to cheat in order to appear eligibles when they’re
not. Brown (2015) called this indirect effect asymmetric informations effect. Our
results show that the positive effects of targeted policies are strong and significant,
while there are no displacement and asymmetric information effects.
As mentioned before, even though, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
empirical evidences on the differences between targeted and untargeted policies, in-
ternational literature on hiring and wage subsidies targeting vulnerable groups of
individuals is huge. Literature reviews generally agree on the positive effect of this
type of active labour market policies, both at macroeconomic level (Martin 2015)
and at microeconomic level (Brown 2015, Calmfors et al. 2002), especially after
negative economic shocks (Martin and Grubb 2001). One of the reasons of their
success is their closeness to regular employment (Calmfors et al. 2002). Most of
these studies warn on the importance of a proper choice of the target group and
of subsidy assignment rules (Brown 2015). The last have to be a good balance
in the trade off between the achievement of a maximum net effect (which requires
stricter rules) and the mantainance of a high take-up rate, which can be lowered if
firms have to face too much bureaucracy (Martin and Grubb 2001). Furthermore,
the studies underline that a targeted policy may have multiple indirect side effects,
such as displacement and asymmetric information effects (Brown and Koettl 2012,
Calmfors et al. 2002). About single study analysis, most of the studies concluded
hiring subsidies have a positive and significant effect (Sianesi 2008, Bucher 2010,
Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. 2012, Bernhard et al. 2008, Forslund et al. 2004, Katz
1996, Mortensen and Pissarides 2001), few of them concluded they have a null ef-
fect (Schu¨nemann et al. 2013, Jaenichen and Stephan 2011, Boone and Ours 2004)
and only two of them concluded they have a negative effect due to targeted group
stigmatization (Kluve et al. 2008, Burtless 1985).
1With this term the author identifies the costs of subsidies benefitting individuals who would have
been hired indipendently from policy implementation.
3The international literature study most closely related to our framework is
Schu¨nemann et al. (2013). They studied the intention-to-treatment effect of an
employer-side wage subsidy program implemented in Germany. Their outcome was
the exit rate from unemployment to unsubsidised employment. The program tar-
geted long-term unemployed and it was implemented from 1989 to 2002. They
exploited the 12 months of unemployment threshold defining eligibility, to apply a
regression discontinuity design. Moreover, they exploited the end of the policy in
2003 to combine the regression discontinuity design with a diff-in-diff model and
clean the estimation from the influence of other incentives applied at the same
eligibility threshold. They found no significant effect. Even though, as the au-
thors mentioned, the estimation may lack of some statistical power due to the low
take-up rate of the policy, they underlined how this result was crucially different
from Sianesi (2008) ones. The last studied the impact of six different swedish ac-
tive labour market programmes. One of them consisted in job subsidies targeting
long-term unemployed 20 to 25 years old. Using a propensity score matching, she
concluded entering in the program, rather than being unemployed, increased em-
ployment rates by 35%. Schu¨nemann et al. (2013) attributed the difference between
the results to the fact that a matching method, in their opinion, wasn’t enough to
take into account of all the selection into treatment. Our result doesn’t fit with this
hypothesis. Indeed, using the same counterfactual method as Schu¨nemann et al.
(2013) we detected a positive and significant effect. In contrast with Schu¨nemann
et al. (2013) opinion, matching procedure has been one of the most used in the
estimation of hiring subsidies impact. Among other studies using this methodology,
there is Kluve et al. (2008). The authors studied two active labour market policies
implemented in Poland between 1992 and 1996. Among them, there was a job sub-
sidized program targeting particularly disadvantaged unemployed. They matched
treated and control groups with respect to demographic informations and the out-
come in the twelve months preceeding the treatment. The authors found a negative
and significant effect on the treated and attributed it to the stigmatization that may
be associated to eligibility. Similarly, Burtless (1985) attributed the negative impact
detected in his study to stigmatization. Exploiting a randomized experiment im-
plemented in Dayton, Ohio from 1980 to 1981, he evaluated the impact of vouchers
provided to a random sample of disadvantaged unemployed. The employers hiring
the eligibles could use the vouchers to have a portion of their wage payed. The
author underlined as the end of the program after six months of implementations
may have biased the results. The two policies analysed by Kluve et al. (2008) and
Burtless (1985), targeted a particularly disadvantaged group of unemployed. It is
unlikely for the policy we studied to have a stigmatization effect. Indeed, the target
is all long-term unemployed and consequently, being eligible doesn’t give any addi-
tional informations on unemployed characteristics.
Among the studies estimating the impact of hiring subsidies, few of them took
into account of the possible indirect effects of the policies (Schu¨nemann et al. 2013,
Calmfors et al. 2002, Bucher 2010, Boockmann et al. 2007). Schu¨nemann et al.
(2013) found no significant displacement effect. Nevertheless, the policy they were
studying had no significant effect either. Calmfors et al. (2002) and Bucher (2010),
instead, found a strong and significant displacement effect. The first work is a lit-
4erature review of different empirical studies. Nevertheless, they present a single
study trying to estimate the displacement effect. It consisted in a survey to firms,
hence its results should be taken with caution. The second work, instead, is based
on a theoretical model, relying on strong assumptions. Finally, Boockmann et al.
(2007) tested for the possibility that firms post-poned some hirings in order to get
the subsidy and concluded that wasn’t the case.
The italian literature on hiring subsidies targeting disadvantaged categories of
individuals is significantly smaller. Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. (2012) studied the
impact of a subsidy incentivising the switch from a temporary to a permanent con-
tract and targeting women and under 30 years old youths. The authors exploited
the age threshold to apply a regression discontinuity design. They found a posi-
tive and significant effect. Nevertheless, their analysis was focused only on Veneto
region. Notwithstanding the low number of studies on italian targeted hiring sub-
sidies, there is a significant amount of literature which estimated the impact of the
generalised ones. In particular, the incentives provided according to 2015 Legge
Stabilita`. Among them, Centra and Gualtieri (2016) used a diff-in-diff model to
determine the impact of the policy on the incidence of permanent contracts among
the total. The authors exploited the fact that, individuals whose previous perma-
nent contract ended less than six months before, were not eligible for the incentive.
They added some covariates to the model to make the parallelism assumption more
plausible. Moreover, they estimated the outcome of the control group in 2015 using
interrupted time series analysis to clean the estimation from a possible displacement
effect of the policy. They found a positive and significant effect. Similar results were
found by Sestito and Viviano (2016). The authors estimated the impact of the same
policy on different outcomes, among which the probability (both for employed and
unemployed) to find a permanent job. They used a diff-in-diff model with individ-
ual, monthly and annual fixed effects. None of these studies considered 2015 Legge
Stabilita` from a LTU perspective. Hence, our work tries to contribute to multiple
issues and to fill multiple gaps in the literature on Active Labour Market Policies
(ALMPs). To the international literature, being the first study analising empiri-
cally the difference between targeted and untargeted policies and giving a reliable
analysis of the indirect effects of targeted policies. To the italian literature, being
the first study analising Law 407/90 and the first considering Law 190 from a LTU
perspective.
We exploited an administrative micro-database, namely CICO database, pro-
vided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. We had access to these data
thanks to an agreement between Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali ed Economiche
of Sapienza University of Rome and INAPP (Istituto Nazionale per l’Analisi delle
Politiche Pubbliche). The database contains reliable informations on contracts’ stip-
ulated from 2008 to 2016 for a sample of individuals. Contracts informations are
communicated to the Ministry directly from the employers.
Following Schu¨nemann et al. (2013), we applied a regression discontinuity design to
estimate the impact of Law 407/90. We used the days of unemployment as a forcing
variable and added daily fixed effects to the standard model. In order to select the
bandwidth, we applied the method proposed by Cattaneo, Frandsen, et al. (2015),
modified in order to take into account of the daily fixed effects. We partially fol-
5lowed Schu¨nemann et al. (2013) to check for the presence of indirect effects. I.e., we
compared the differences in hirings before and after the policy ending, for values of
the forcing variable far and close to the threshold. Finally, we applied a regression
discontinuity design using time as a forcing variable, to estimate the impact of the
generalised incentives provided by 2015 Legge Stabilita`. In order to parcel out the
impact of the generalised incentives from the impact of Law 407/90 ending we used
a control group to do this last estimation selected following the methodology used
in the first estimation. Under the first estimation assumptions, the effect estimated
on the control group, can be a good representation of the impact, on the treated,
of the generalised incentives in absence of Law 407/90 ending.
From the analysis, it emerged Law 407/90 had a strong, positive and significant
effect on LTU hirings. The estimated impact was meaningfully higher than in previ-
ous studies using eligibility as treatment. This may be due to the high take-up rate
and to country characteristics. We didn’t detect any displacement or asymmetric
information effects.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow: in section 2 are provided infor-
mations on the causes of LTU duration dependence, the role of ALMPs contrasting
them, the studied policies and their comparison. In section 3 the data and the used
sample are presented. In section 4 the methodologies used in each estimation are
described, the needed assumptions are discussed and the results are presented. In
section 5 we resumed the conclusions of this study.
2 Long-Term Unemployed Conditions and Ital-
ian Policies
2.1 Long-Term Unemployed Stigma
Long-term unemployment status is characterised by a strong duration dependence.
Many authors (Mussida 2010, Obermeier and Meier 2016, Heckman and Borjas 1980,
Farooq and Kugler 2015, Duell et al. 2016) estimated the probability to exit from
unemployment status for different unemployment durations. Indipendently from
the considered Country and period, they found that, once taken into account of
heterogeneity, such probability lowered as the duration of unemployment increased.
Past literature (Farooq and Kugler 2015, Brown and Koettl 2012, Brown 2015)
identified three main causes for duration dependence:
1. The possible loss of human capital and the lack of recent working experience
due to the absence from employment, whose consequence is a lower desider-
ability of the long term unemployed.
2. The reduction of contacts the unemployed has with the labour market. Indeed,
employers often use informal channels to recruit. This reason is particularly
effective during recession periods since using informal channels to recruit allows
employer to reduce recruitment costs.
3. The scarring effect affecting LTU. In real labour market there is imperfect in-
formation. Employers tend to exploit the limited tools they have, to determine
6whether a candidate will be productive or not. One of the tools they use is
whether the candidate has been rejected by previous employers. Rejection is
used as a signal of low productivity or presence of other unobservable nega-
tive characteristics. LTU are automatically classified as rejected several times
(even though this is not necessary true). Many authors tried to detect and
quantify this last effect. All of them concluded there was a scarring effect due
to long-term unemployment (Biewen and Steffes 2010, Oberholzer-Gee 2008,
Omori 1997, Kroft et al. 2013, Baert and Verhaest 2014, Ayllo`n 2013).
Ideally, ALMPs lowering labour cost, as hiring subsidies, overcome these issues
both in the short and long term. Indeed, the lower labour cost should counteract
the lower desiderability of the LTU. Once the last has been hired, she will recover
recent working experience, increase contacts with the labour market and be screened
by the hiring employer overcoming the imperfect informations characterising labour
market.
In light of what we’ve just explained, we can imagine the demand curves of LTU and
short-term unemployed with, on average, similar characteristics, to be representable
by the following graph. The red line represents the demand curve of short-term
unemployed and the blue line represents the demand curve of long-term unemployed:
Note that the shape of the two curves is simplified for illustrative porpoises. As it
is possible to see, in correspondence of the same labour cost, the demand of LTU is
always lower than the demand of short term unemployed. The difference between
the two hirings amount is due to the lower desirability of LTU. Hence it can be in-
terpreted as the combination of the effects of the lack of recent working experience,
of the reduction of contacts with the labor market and of the scarring effect of LTU.
7Note that, even though LTU are less desirable than other unemployed, their curve
of demand isn’t constantly equal zero. This is coherent with empirical evidence.
Indeed, LTU are still hired. Moreover, it is coherent with literature on scarring
effect, from which it emerged the last was heterogeneous across individuals, type of
job or contracts (Omori 1997, Baert and Verhaest 2014, Ayllo`n 2013). The fact that
the curve of demand of LTU isn’t constantly equal zero suggests employers group to
be highly heterogeneous. Some employers, depending on their characteristics, their
experiences and on the type of work they offer, may not stigmatize LTU.
2.2 Law 407/90 and Generalised Incentives
Law 407 was promulgated on December 29th 1990. According to it, any firm had
access to tax credits for a period of 36 months, at the condition of hiring, with
a permanent contract, individuals who had been either in unemployment status,
or suspended from their job, or in Cassa Integrazione (temporary layoff), for at
least 24 months. In Italy, firms have to pay, for each employee, a rate of her wage
to the social security service, and a much smaller rate to an institution providing
work insurance. The tax credits corresponded, for regular firms, to 50% of the
total amount of taxes the firm would have had to pay for the hired individuals. It
corresponded to 100% of the same amount for artisans firms and firms located in
the Mezzogiorno area of Italy. The policy aimed at reducing the rate of long-term
unemployed and workers in Cassa Integrazione or suspended. In order to avoid the
temptation, for the employers, to substitute workers of the firm with individuals
hired through law 407/90, a firm, to be eligible, couldn’t have experienced, in the
last six months, firings or workers’ suspending or voluntary resignation, or the end
of a temporary contract. In June 28th 2012 the rules defining eligibility on firm side
were relaxed and the conditions to be classified as unemployed slightly changed. The
law ended on December 31st 2014 according to 2015 Legge Stabilita`, promulgated
on December 23rd 2014.
We focused on the impact of this policy on LTU hirings, not considering the
other categories in the targeted group. This policy was widely exploited on italian
labour market. According to INPS’ reports it has been the policy, for the increase of
permanent contracts, with the highest number of recipients between 2011 and 2014.
In particular, the number of individuals who benefitted by this Law went from a
minimum of 295’417 to a maximum of 305’327 among the years 2011-2014 (where
this amount includes suspended workers and workers in temporary layoff as well)2.
In the following graph it is represented the number of individuals with respect to
their unemployment duration from 2011 to 2014.
2Source: Statistiche in breve, Politiche Occupazionali e del Lavoro,
http://servizi.inps.it/banchedatistatistiche/menu/index.html
8It is possible to see a clear downward jump at the 729 threshold defining eligibility
(evidenced by the red line). This gives a first suggestion on policy effectiveness.
The generalised incentives provided by Legge Stabilita` 2015, consisted in tax
credits to firms hiring unemployed with a permanent contract or turning a tem-
porary contract to a permanent ones. Tax credits corresponded to 100% of the
taxes the firm had to pay to the social security service for each individual. In order
to avoid the temptation, for the employers, to fire and followingly hire again their
employees, firms couldn’t obtain the tax credit hiring individuals who were fired
from a permanent contract less than six months before. The policy, implemented
since January 1st 2015, lasted one year3. The development of this policy raised a
huge debate on the effectiveness of the law. Indeed, its implementation was used
as a political weapon from all the political fronts. The policy was widely used.
According to INPS’ data, 1’078’885 were the new permanent contracts stipulated
taking advantage from it4. In the following graph it is represented the share of hired
individuals among unemployed with slightly less than 24 months of unemployment
across months for 2014 and 2015.
3It was followed by an equivalent policy with tax credits corresponding to 50% of labour taxes.
4Source: Osservatorio Precariato, INPS
9It is possible to see that hirings in 2015, hence under Law 190 incentives, are higher
than in 2014, in absence of incentives (indeed the group was not eligible for Law
407/90 subsidies). This suggests Law 190 incentives were effective. It is important
to notice the peak in hirings in December 2015. This peak can be attributed to the
fact that the policy was implemented for a limited and short period of time and its
duration was communicated in advance. To compare the two types of incentives in
a more general way, we estimated the impact of the untargeted incentives excluding
the observation about December 2015.
The two policies don’t differ only with respect to their target group. Indeed,
while Law 407/90 gave 100% tax credit only to determined firms, 2015 Legge Sta-
bilita` gave it to all firms. Moreover, Legge Stabilita` 2015 incentives covered the
taxes due to the social security service only, while Law 407/90 covered both the
taxes due to the social service and the taxes due to the institution providing work
insurance (the last are significantly smaller5). These differences appear negligible
with respect to the target difference. Indeed, the restriction of the analysis to the
Mezzogiorno area (where both Law 407/90 and Law 190 gave 100% tax credits)
doesn’t give significantly different results (see appendix A). Moreover, a compari-
son between the estimated average amount of subsidies given under Law 407/90 in
the period 2011-2014 and the average amount that would have been given under
Law 190 for the same individuals and the same wages suggests they don’t differ
much economically (see appendix B). Another source of difference between the two
laws could be the consciousness of firms about the existence of the policies. Never-
theless, the wide use of Law 407/90 and the attention given by the media to 2015
5The percentage of wage payed to the social security service is, on average, 29.8%. The percentage of
wage payed to the insitution providing work insurance is, on average 2.9%
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Legge Stabilita` suggests both the policies were well known by italian firms.
2.3 Two Types of Hiring Subsidies
The main difference between targeted and untargeted incentives is that the first
lower the labour cost in relative terms, while the second lower them only in absolute
terms. Hence, if targeted incentives are implemented the LTU become economically
more convenient than STU. This is not the case with untargeted incentives. The
idea behind targeted incentives is that the lower labour cost of the targeted group is
enough to counteract its lower desirability. Empirical evidence suggests in the het-
erogeneous employers group there will be some for whom the incentive isn’t enough
to counteract the lower desirability. Indeed, under the policy, LTU hirings are still
lower than STU’s. This group of employers, won’t react differently to the two dif-
ferent types of incentives. Equally, the group of employers who doesn’t consider
LTU as less desirable won’t react differently. In both cases, the first category of
employers won’t hire LTU and the second category will hire LTU considering only
their lower labour cost. The eventual presence of a third group of employers will
make the difference between the two incentives types. There may be a group of
employers for whom the LTU have a lower desirability but for whom the relatively
lower labour cost under Law 407/90 is enough to counteract it. If this group exists,
its hirings will be higher under Law 407/90 than under 2015 Legge Stabilita` incen-
tives. Indeed, under the first policy the lower desirability of LTU is counteracted by
the relatively lower labour cost. Under the second policy, instead, the labour cost
of STU is lowered as well, hence in relative terms the labour cost of LTU doesn’t
change.
As mentioned before, the main difference between the two incentives we studied
is that Law 407/90 ones targeted LTU, while 2015 Legge Stabilita` incentives were
extended to all unemployed. This element, and the proximity of the two policies in
time, allow us to take general conclusions on the difference between targeted and
untargeted incentives from the comparison between their impacts.
3 Data and Sample Definition
Thanks to an agreement between Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali ed Economiche
of Sapienza University of Rome and INAPP (Istituto Nazionale per l’Analisi delle
Politiche Pubbliche) we had access to the used data. We used a micro-databases,
available, through INAPP, to the participants to the agreement. It is an adminis-
trative database, called CICO. It was provided by the Italian Ministry of Labour
and Social Policies (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali). It contains all
recorded employment and parasubordinate contracts6 and some self-employment
events (coming from INPS’ data) for a random sample of individuals. Each record
corresponds to a different contract and reports the worker ID, the firm ID, con-
tract’s and job’s characteristics and starting and ending dates, and some basic
socio-demographic characteristics of the individual, such as age, income and region
of residence. The data are collected by the Ministry directly from the employers,
6The last is a type of contract, present on italian labour market, having some of the characteristics of
employment and some of the characteristics of self-employment
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who must register the contract and provide all the informations. After the collection
of records, the last are submitted, by the Ministry, to a validation procedures. The
data started to be recorded from 2008. Nevertheless, previous observations were
reconstructed by the Ministry to provide additional informations. These data have
some great advantages. From 2008 on, they are precise and valid from the point of
view of records of contracts’ start and end. They report detailed working histories
of the individuals, in the continuous across nine years. Nevertheless, they have some
limits. Given that the data report only employment experience, there is a lack of
informations on individual’s status in the period between the end of a contract and
the start of the subsequent ones. Hence, we can’t determine with certainty whether
the individual was actually unemployed in the missing spell 7. Nevertheless, we
took into account of this issue in the analysis (see section 4.1.2).
Using CICO, we built a new database where each unit identifies, rather than
a recorded contract, a group of individuals having a determined number of days
in a non-CICO-recorded status, at a determined day. To be more precise, in the
new database, unit ij identifies the group of individuals with i days in a non-CICO-
recorded status at day j. With a non-CICO-recorded status we mean an employment
status not recorded in CICO database (for simplicity we’ll call it “non-occupation”
from now on, since most of the occupational statuses are recorded). This means unit
ij contains informations about the group having the last recorded contract ending
i days before day j and the next starting after, or on, day j. Consequently, each
unit starts to be counted from the end of the first contract recorded on CICO. This
re-elaboration of the data has a great advantage. Indeed, it allows to exploit the
continuus nature of the data, maintaining a number of observations and variables
low enough for the analysis to be computationally feasible. Without the data ag-
gregation, in order to do the analysis across all days, we would have had to register
1825 variables reporting the employment status of 3’138’373 individuals. With the
aggregation the number of observations to register and process is 6’357’570 but only
one variable is needed. At the same time, the aggregation doesn’t cause any loss of
useful informations.
Given that the records are not reliable if recorded before 2008, we only con-
sidered records subsequent to December 31st 2007. Since we mostly focused on
long-term unemployed this means we have useful informations starting from 2010.
Indeed, it is from 2010 that we start having units far enough from the last recorded
contract to be possibly considered LTU. The variables recorded in the new database
for each unit ij are the share of individuals, in the group, that are hired in day j,
the total number of individuals in the group and the share of individuals in the
group with given socio-demographic characteristics.
Following Schu¨nemann et al. (2013), Anastasia, Giraldo, et al. (2012), Boock-
mann et al. (2007), Huttunen et al. (2013), Hamersma (2008), Forslund et al. (2004),
Sestito and Viviano (2016) and Centra and Gualtieri (2016), we used eligibility to de-
fine the treated and control groups. This means we estimated intention-to-treatment
effect, rather than average treatment effect. Following Schu¨nemann et al. (2013),
we can report three main reasons to do it. The first one is that comparing workers
with similair probability to be treated, don’t assure the absence of selection bias in
7I.e. other categories not covered by CICO informations besides unemployed are students, housekeep-
ers, inactive retired, inactive disables, etc.
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the estimation of the average treatment effect. Indeed, the subsidy has to be re-
quired by the employer and there may be an employer selection. Hence, controlling
for employees characteristics only, may not be enough to solve entirely the selection
bias problem. The second is that, exploiting the eligibility threshold of the policy
we can use a RDD. Finally, using eligibles as treated group, the estimated effect
is the intention-to-treatment ones, the last is the main parameter of interest from
a policy perspective. Indeed, wage subsidies can’t be mandatory. Wage subsidies’
policies give the possibility to take up a subsidy, not the subsidy itself. Policy mak-
ers only have control on the intention to treatment, they have no power on subsidy
reception. It is of biggest interest the impact of policies policy makers can control,
and the last have control only on eligibility rules. A fourth reason, strictly linked
with our framework, is that, using subsidy reception as treatment, it would have
been hard, to determine how the implementation of 2015 Legge Stabilita` affected
the treated group.
In order to estimate the ITT of Law 407/90 we used data about the period
2011-2014 concerning the control and treated group chosen according to bandwidth
selection method. To be able to determine the presence of indirect effect we con-
sidered all units with a forcing variable lower than the threshold across the period
2011-2016. Finally, in the regression discontinuity design for the incentives of Law
190 impact, we used records for the control group across the period 2010-2015.
4 Identification Strategy
4.1 Law 407/90 Intention-to-Treatment Effect
To estimate the impact of Law 407/90 we applied a regression discontinuity design
with daily fixed effects. It has been demonstrated that, when units at the threshold
are considered, the regression discontinuity design is, at the threshold, as reliable
as the golden standard of policy evaluation: randomized treatment assignment (Lee
2008).
The main condition to apply this method is the presence of a threshold, defined
on a continuous variable, and defining treatment assignment. In this context, eligi-
bility (hence our treatment) is defined with respect to the 24 months threshold on
the continuous variable reporting unemployment days.
We used the following linear regression model:
yij = α+ βDij + θj + ij (4.1)
Where the dependent variable is the share (with respect to the number of individuals
in the entire group) of individuals of group (ij) hired in day j. Variable Dij is a
dummy taking value 1 if individuals in group (ij) are eligibles. The θj are the daily
fixed effects. The presence of daily fixed effects allow us to consider each daily
comparison as independent from the others. Moreover, it allows us to overcome
seasonality issues. Contracts’ starting and ending dates are characterised by a strong
seasonality. Not taking into account of it could bias the estimation of treatment
effect. To be more clear, there are months of the year, as December, characterized by
a high number of contracts’ endings and a low number of hirings. Since individuals
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become eligible in the month their last contract ended, there is a big group of
individuals becoming eligible in a month characterized by low hirings and this can
bias the estimation. Controlling for the hiring day we overcome this issue. It is easy
to see that the effect of Law 407/90 is given by parameter β.
We followed Cattaneo, Frandsen, et al. (2015) and Li et al. (2015) approach to
select the bandwidth. Its basic idea is to include in the estimation only units close
enough to the threshold, to be able to consider the model as a local randomized
experiment. We used Cattaneo, Frandsen, et al. (2015) methodology modifying
it. To exploit the fact that we have a particularly high number of observations
around the threshold when doing inference and to take into account of daily fixed
effects included in the model when implementing the balancing test. Given the
high number of observations around the threshold, we didn’t need to apply the
methodology proposed by Cattaneo, Frandsen, et al. (2015) to do inference, avoiding
the functional form assumptions it requires. To do their balancing test, we used a
paired t-test rather than a regular ones, pairing units belonging to the same day.
This guaranteed us the treated and control groups to be balanced and comparable
each single day. In the balancing test, we used as covariates the share, in the
group defined from the unit, of women, of individuals with different educational
qualification, of individuals who started their first job at different age class, of
foreign citizens, of individuals working in different working sectors or geographical
areas during the last contract. The approach we applied to select the bandwidth
allowed us not to include the forcing variable in the model. The correctness of its
exclusion was confirmed by the fact that, inside the bandwidth, the forcing variable
has no significant impact on the outcome for treated and control group separately.
The selected bandwidth went from 714 to 744 days of unemployment (where 729 is
our threshold). Hence, we included all units becoming eligibles in two weeks or less
and all units who became eligibles since two weeks or less.
The results of this estimation are reported in table 1 (for obvious reason we
excluded the daily parameters). As common, we use, as significativity level, a 0.05
VARIABLES Coefficients
Treat 3.01e-05***
(4.62e-06)
Constant 9.38e-05***
(2.82e-06)
Observations 45,291
R-squared 0.094
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1: Intention to treatment effect of Law 407/90 is given by Treat.
ones. The results suggest Law 407/90 had a positive and significant impact. Even
though the magnitude of the impact may look small this is not the case. Indeed, the
outcome itself has a very low magnitude. Comparing the estimated impact with the
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average weighted outcome of the control group, we can conclude the policy increased
the last by 36%. This value is bigger than the results obtained in previous literature.
Most of the studies estimating intention-to-treatment effect concluded there wasn’t
a significant effect (see Boockmann et al. 2007, Huttunen et al. 2013, Schu¨nemann
et al. 2013) and one of them found a positive and significant effect of 10% in the
short run (Hamersma 2008). Nevertheless, this difference can be explained by three
reasons. The first one is that the policy we studied was widely used. The second is
that it was implemented across a very long period (i.e. 24 years). The third is that
almost all of the afore-mentioned authors (with the exception of Schu¨nemann et al.
2013) used a methodology which estimated the impact of the policy for the whole
population of eligibles. Using a RDD, instead, we obtained only local results. This
means our estimation describes the effect of the policy only for the group of eligibles
included in the bandwidth. This is one of the most affected groups. Indeed, of the
hirings under Law 407/90, around 38% involved individuals with 24 to 27 months
of unemployment.
4.1.1 Bandwidth Choice in a time-varying forcing variable frame-
work
The approach to use in bandwidth selection has been led by the nature of our forcing
variable. The last has the particularity to change over time. Consequently we can’t
widen the bandwidth and use the linear polynomial approach. To explain the differ-
ences between a time fixed and a time varying forcing variable we have to take into
account of that, and its consequences. In standard contexts where regression discon-
tinuity design is implemented, there is a single event where a single forcing variable
(and, consequently, the treated group) is defined. In this context, instead, a unit
having a determined value of the forcing variable at day j will have a different forc-
ing variable at day j+ 1. In standard contexts, the forcing variable of a unit can be
considered as a resume of all the characteristics determining its selection into treat-
ment. In the case of a time-varying forcing variable, instead, all units, regardless of
their characteristics, will have a forcing variable of 0 days at the start of their unem-
ployment period, most of them will have a forcing variable of 5 days, and so on so
forth. We can then imagine there are two types of forcing variable: the potential and
the observed ones. The potential forcing variable resumes the characteristics of the
unit determining its selection into treatment (in our framework the potential length
of its unemployment spell at hiring time in absence of treatment). The observed
forcing variable is the forcing variable we’re able to observe. In standard framework,
the observed forcing variable and the potential forcing variable coincide. Hence, it
is enough to control for the observed forcing variable to be sure to control for all the
characteristics determining selection into treatment. In time-varying forcing vari-
able frameworks, instead, the observed forcing variable takes multiple values and it
doesn’t necessary coincide (i.e. it coincides one day only in our framework) with
the potential forcing variable. Nevertheless, there is some sort of correlation among
the two forcing variables. Indeed, it is unlikely for an individual with a potential
forcing variable of 3 months to have an observed one of 24 months. In particular,
it is reasonable to hypothesize a group of units with an observed forcing variable of
FVObs = f to have a distribution of the potential forcing variable with few units pre-
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senting a value of FVPot << f and most of the units whose potential forcing variable
is equally distributed in the interval FVPot ∈ [f−,∞) with  ≥ 0 reasonably small.
As an example, the distribution of the potential forcing variable across groups with
an observed forcing variable of 3, 23 or 24 months can be hypothesized to be as rep-
resented in the following graph8. Note that this representation is fully hypothetical.
It is possible to see that under this reasonable hypothesis, groups of individuals with
similar values of the observed forcing variable have similar distributions of the po-
tential ones. Hence, if the bandwidth on the observed forcing variable is chosen
to be small enough, it is reasonable to assume that treated and control groups
have the same potential forcing variable distribution. And, consequently, the same
characteristics in terms of selection into treatment determinants. Cattaneo, Frand-
sen, et al. (2015) method allows to choose a bandwidth with these characteristics.
Indeed, it allows to choose a bandwidth such that, the group of units having an
observed forcing variable under the threshold doesn’t differ from the group having
it over the threshold in terms of selection-into-treatment-determinant characteris-
tics. On the contrary, the approach based on local polynomial, which use a much
larger bandwidth, wouldn’t guarantee us that the treated and controls have the
same characteristics.
8Notice that the hypothesis we’re making on potential forcing variable distribution is more stringent
than what we need. Indeed, for our considerations to be valid it is enough that groups of units with
close values of the observed forcing variable have similar distribution of the potential ones, while groups
of units with remote values of the observed forcing variable don’t.
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4.1.2 Are the Assumptions to use Regression Discontinuity Design
Plausible in this Context?
Three main assumptions are required in order to use the Regression Discontinuity
Design. The first one is the assumption of randomness in the distribution of units
around the threshold. It is likely to be satisfied. Indeed, being, at a determined
day, unemployed from 23 months and 28 days or 24 months, is not under control
of the unemployed. There is a random component on the day the previous contract
ended. There is another random component in the employers the unemployed got
in contact with and the time it happened (to be unemployed since 24 months when
hired, the unemployed has to find the right match at the right moment). The second
one is the requirement of absence of sorting due to forcing variable manipulation.
This is certainly satisfied. Indeed, the definition of the forcing variable determining
law eligibility was based on the registration of the unemployed, to the employment
agency, at the unemployment period starting date. Hence, the value of the individ-
ual forcing variable was completely under control of the employment agency. The
unemployed had no control on it. The third assumption, namely the stable unit
treatment value assumption, may be violated. Nevertheless, we checked it taking
into account of displacement effect (see 4.2) and controlling for the reception of
other benefits in sample selection.
The use of CICO database requires an additional assumption. In CICO, there are no
informations precisely on unemployment. This can cause a biased estimation if the
control and the treated groups behave differently during the non-CICO-detected pe-
riods. As an example, if most controls are studying while most treated are actually
unemployed during the 24 months, this can cause higher hirings of the first group.
The consequence would be an underestimation of the policy impact. Nevertheless,
this problem only arises if the distributions of non-CICO-detected spells is different
between the treated and the control groups used in the estimation. This is unlikely
to be, given the bandwidth selection criteria. Nevertheless, we checked for it looking
to the distribution of individuals among different non-CICO-detected categoris. We
used RTFL data. The last are survey quarterly data from ISTAT. Using them, we
were able to verify that the distribution of individuals between different categories
of non-CICO-detected spells was similar between treated and control groups each
year (see appendix C).
The model was robust to changes in the bandwidth, to covariates addition and to
placebo tests both with respect to different thresholds and with respect to different
years (see appendix D). To have an additional proof of the validity of our method-
ology, we studied the correlation between the number of subsidised individuals and
the estimated treatment effect across different years. In table 2, the coefficients of
the treatment and the number of subsidised are reported.
The number of subsidised and estimated treatment effect present a high corre-
lation. This suggests our regression model effectively detected the impact of the
studied policy.
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Correlation 0.98808
Year Treatment Effect Subsidised
2011 4.34e-05 25202
2012 4.69e-05 26539
2013 2.48e-05 20118
2014 3.81e-05 24689
Table 2: Correlation between the number of subsidised individuals and ITT across years.
4.2 Indirect Effects
Taking into account of the indirect effects of a policy is crucial for two reasons.
First of all, it gives a deeper overview on policy effects. Secondly, it allows to check
the correctness of the estimated impact. Indeed, if the indirect effects affect the
control group the estimation is biased. In their studies, Brown and Koettl (2012)
and Calmfors et al. (2002), underlined as targeted hiring subsidies may have dif-
ferent indirect side effects. Among the effects enumerated, two are relevant in our
setting. The first one is that non-targeted individuals having similar characteristics
to the targeted ones, may be penalised by policy implementation. Indeed, thanks
to the policy, they have similar characteristics, but a higher labour cost, than tar-
geted individuals. In our setting this means that hirings of individuals with, g.e.
23 months of unemployment may decrease when the policy is implemented because
firms prefer to hire eligibles when hiring someone who’s unemployed from long time.
This side effect is called displacement effect. The second side effect is due to the
presence of asymmetric information. Indeed, the public authorities providing the
incentives have not perfect information on all firms and unemployed. This means
firms and unemployed can cheat in order to get the subsidy even when they’re not
eligibles. In our framework, i.e., firms can decide to hire an individual when she is
close and under the threshold defining eligibility (as a g.e. when she is unemployed
from 23 months) and wait to hire her until she becomes eligible. We can call this
effect post-poned hirings effect.
Both displacement and post-poned hirings effects imply a reduction in hirings of
uneligible individuals whose value of the forcing variable is close (and obviously
under) the threshold. They don’t affect units with a value of the forcing variable
too far from the threshold. I.e., it is unlikely displacement effect affects individ-
uals with, as an example, 13 months of unemployment. Indeed, the two groups
have completely different characteristics. Similarly, it is unlikely that an employer
would accept to wait 11 months, until the 13 months unemployed becomes eligible,
to hire her, just to get the subsidy. This is the only observable element we can
use to determine whether the two effects are present (and, eventually, correct the
counterfactual estimation for them). To use it, we can’t just compare the outcome
for units close to and under the threshold with the outcome for units far9 from and
under the threshold. Indeed, their outcome would probably be significantly different
in absence of the policy as well. Hence, we compared the difference between the
9When we say units “far” we mean they are far enough to reasonably assume they are not affected by
displacement and post-poned hiring effects.
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outcome after 2014 and the outcome before 2015 for units close to and under the
threshold with the difference in the correspondent outcomes for units far from and
under the threshold. We exploited the fact that Law 407/90 ended in 2014, hence
there can’t be displacement and post-poned hiring effects in 2015 (at least not for
the group we checked for). If these two effects are present, we would expect the size
of the difference to be smaller far from the threshold than close to the threshold.
In absence of them, instead, there would be no reason for the difference to diverge
getting closer to the threshold. For this method to be valid, we have to assume
that, in absence of the policy, the difference would be smooth across close intervals
of the forcing variable. This allows us to attribute the absence of regularity in the
difference to the displacement and post-poned hirings effects.
In the following image, is it possible to see the Kernel-weighted local polynomial
smoothing of the difference between the average outcome before 2015 and after 2014
with respect to the forcing variable. This first graphical analysis suggests there are
no post-poned hirings and displacement effects.
Indeed, even though the difference decrease close to the threshold (where the thresh-
old corresponds to a forcing variable value of 729), it does it far from the threshold
as well. There is no unusual behaviour getting closer to it.
This conclusion is consistent with the results of the statisical tests comparing
the average difference between two different groups of units far from the threshold
and one group of units close to it. In tables 3 and 4 the results of some Welch t-tests
are presented. The difference for the interval defining the control group is compared
with the difference for two intervals defined on values of the forcing variable far from
the threshold.
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Comparison group: [365:380] Days of Unempl
Year Diff Mean Std. Err. CI 95% Lower CI 95% Upper
2011 -2.19e-06 5.91e-05 -1.18e-04 1.14e-04
2012 1.288e-04 7.23e-05 -1.32e-05 2.707e-04
2013 -1.17e-05 4-69e-05 -1.039e-04 8.04e-05
2014 -9.62e-07 4.61e-05 -9.15e-05 8.96e-05
Table 3: Welch t-tests results: Checking for the presence of Displacement and Post-Poned
Hirings Effects.
From the tests’ results it is possible to see that displacement and post-poned hir-
Comparison group: [545:560] Days of Unempl
Year Diff Mean Std. Err. CI 95% Lower CI 95% Upper
2011 -3.64e-06 6.17e-05 -1.247e-04 1.175e-04
2012 1.138e-04 5.8e-05 -4.96e-09 2.276e-04
2013 8.91e-05 6.04e-05 -2.94e-05 2.076e-04
2014 1.033e-04 5.52e-05 -4.96e-06 2.116e-04
Table 4: Welch t-tests results: Checking for the presence of Displacement and Post-Poned
Hirings Effects.
ings effects are not detected in any year.
The fact that these effects aren’t present may look surprising. Nevertheless, two
elements have to be considered. The first one is that often employers prefer to hire
individuals as soon as possible. As an example, from a study by Oberholzer-Gee
(2008), it emerged that they often prefer to hire short term unemployed rather than
employed individuals, because the first are immediately available to work. Equally,
they may prefer to hire uneligibles close to the threshold immediately, rather than
wait for them to become eligibles. In other words, they may prefer a worker imme-
diately available rather than the subsidy. The second one, is that in Italy there are
mainly small and medium firms. A small firm won’t probably receive a huge amount
of applications and curricula at a time. Hence, it is unlikely the firm receives the
curriculum of an individual close and under the threshold and the curriculum of
an individual close and over the threshold at the same time. Just as it is unlikely,
when it receives a curriculum from an individual close and under the threshold,
that the firm will decide not to hire her and wait for the curriculum of an eligible
individual. Hence, the absence of displacement effect isn’t surprising as well. This
last result is in contrast with Bucher (2010) study and Calmfors et al. (2002) litera-
ture review. Indeed, according to the first there was a displacement effect damaging
short term unemployed. Nevertheless, her analysis was based on a theoretical model
which strongly simplified reality. According to the second, the displacement effect
of targeted employment subsidies had an average effect of 84%. Nevertheless, the
value was based on a single study consisting in surveys to employers. If an employer
answer “yes” when someone asked her whether she would prefer to hire a subsidised
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individual with respect to an unsubsidised individual with similar characteristics,
this doesn’t mean if she actually receive the curriculum of the unsubsidised she will
reject it and wait for another curriculum by an eligible with similar characteristics.
The result on the absence of post-poned hirings effect, instead, is consistent with pre-
vious literature and, in particular, with Boockmann et al. (2007) and Schu¨nemann
et al. (2013) conclusions.
4.3 Generalised Incentives Intention-To-Treatment Ef-
fect
To estimate the impact of generalised hiring incentives from a LTU perspective, we
used another regression discontinuity design. We used time as a forcing variable and
exploited the January 1st 2015 threshold defining eligibility. We couldn’t estimate
the impact of the policy on the exact same group targeted by Law 407/90. Indeed,
we wouldn’t be able to distinguish between the effect of Law 407/90 ending and
the effect of the generalised incentives start. Hence, we estimated the intention-to-
treatment effect on a control group selected according to the modified Cattaneo,
Frandsen, et al. (2015) method (see 4.1) and assumed it not to differ significantly
from our target group. Given that we used monthly dummies we needed the control
group to be balanced with the LTU group at a monthly level. Hence, we used the
paired t-test pairing units belonging to the same month and year (nevertheless, the
results don’t change in a significant way if we do the same analysis on the control
group used in 4.1). The assumption that the two groups don’t differ significantly is
necessary to compare the intention-to-treatment effects of the two policies. In order
to estimated the impact of untargeted incentives generally rather than the impact
of Law 190 incentives themselves we excluded observations about December 2015.
Indeed, the peak corresponding to that observations is probably due to a charac-
teristic specificly of this policy: its short duration. We want more general results,
representing the impact of a generic untargeted policy and being comparable with
Law 407/90. We applied the following regression model to data on the period from
January 2010 to November 2015:
yk = α+
12∑
l=1
θlml,k + γ1Tk + γ2T
2
k + γ3Pk + γ4Tk ∗ Pk + γ5T 2k ∗ Pk + k (4.2)
We aggregated the units, with values of the forcing variable inside the selected
bandwidth, at a daily level. In the model, ml,k are dummies taking value 1 if unit
k belongs to month l and zero otherwise. The monthly dummies are used to take
into account of seasonality. Tk is the time variable and Pk is a dummy flagging
the period Law 190 was in place. The rest of the notation is as before. The effect
of the policy is given by the coefficient γ3. We decided not to use a higher order
polynomial to avoid overfitting (Gelman and Imbens 2017). Table 5 reports the
result of this estimation (for brevity porpoises we excluded the monthly dummies).
It is possible to see that the intention-to-treatment effect of the incentives is
non-significant. The estimated impact is not different from the ones estimated in
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VARIABLES Coefficients
Time -6.26e-08***
(2.27e-08)
Time2 2.47e-11**
(1.10e-11)
Policy -6.74e-03
(4.96e-03)
Policy*Time 6.79e-06
(4.99e-06)
Policy*Time2 -1.69e-09
(1.25e-09)
Constant 1.59e-04***
(1.57e-05)
Observations 2,160
R-squared 0.087
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Generalised incentives ITT on vulnerable group is given by γ3. Observations about
December 2015 excluded.
the placebo tests (see section E.1). We can conclude the effect of these incentives
is significantly smaller than Law 407/90 ones. As said before (see section 2.2),
this difference is mainly attributable to the fact that Law 407/90 incentives are
targeted and Law 190 incentives are not. This result suggests the impact of tar-
geted incentives is entirely due to the lower labour cost of the targeted group, which
counteract its lower desirability. Consequently, when a generalised policy is im-
plemented, it should be accompained by additional incentives tailored around the
vulnerable groups of unemployed in order for them to be affected by it.
To provide additional informations on the mechanism behind the policies and on
Law 190 incentives impact, we repeated the analysis including observations about
December 2015. The results of this estimation are reported in table 6.
The policy had a positive and significant impact. The last was considerably lower
than Law 407/90 impact. This suggests a significant component of the impact of
Law 190 incentives is probably due to the limited duration of the policy itself. In
particular, the whole effect of the incentives can be attributed to the December peak
in hirings.
4.3.1 Are the Assumptions to use RDD with time forcing variable
Plausible in this Context?
The use of models based on time discontinuity requires some conditions to be satis-
fied. First of all there can’t be an anticipation effect. If policy effect is anticipated
with respect to policy implementation starting time, the last can’t be used as thresh-
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VARIABLES Coefficients
Time -6.26e-08***
(2.28e-08)
Time2 2.49e-11**
(1.11e-11)
Policy 0.0211**
(8.99e-03)
Policy*Time -2.15e-05**
(9.09e-06)
Policy*Time2 5.48e-09**
(2.29e-09)
Constant 1.46e-04***
(1.63e-05)
Observations 2,191
R-squared 0.126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Law 190 incentives ITT on vulnerable group is given by γ3.
old in the discontinuity analysis. Luckily, the policy was announced on December
23rd 2014, few weeks before its implementation starting time. It is therefore un-
likely there was an anticipation effect. Soumerai and Ross-Degnan (2002) suggested
other assumptions which have to be satisfied when models based on time discon-
tinuity are used. In particular, there shouldn’t be shocks happening at the policy
time and having a significant impact on the outcome, other than the policy itself.
Possible causes of violation of this condition are an exogenous changement in overall
economic conditions, the implementation, in the same period, of other laws, or a
possible changement in the composition of the study population. Considering the
first source of violation, in our framework, an increase in hirings may follow, as an
example, an improvement in overall economic conditions. To verify whether this is
the case, we added to the regression three exogenous variables that can proxy the
economic conditions of the Country and observed that the intention-to-treatment
effect estimation didn’t change (suggesting the assumption holds). The first two
were the annual final consumptions of non-resident families in Italy both in current
and one year lagged values. The third one was the one year lagged quarterly value
of GDP. The use of the lagged value is required for the variable to be exogenous
and it is justified by the fact that, as mentioned by Centra and Gualtieri (2016), the
improvement in the economic conditions usually have a delayed effect on hirings.
We used ISTAT data on GDP and consumptions10.
The second possible source of violation comes from the fact that in 2015 the Jobs
Act was implemented. This Law brought significant changes to permanent con-
tracts’ rules, relaxing the costraints a permanent contract implied on employer’s
10Data Sources: http://dati.istat.it/
side starting from March 2015. To verify whether this brought to an overestima-
tion of Law 190 intention-to-treatment effect, we re-estimated the model excluding
observations from March 2015 on. The new estimated intention-to-treatment effect
was higher than the ones obtained excluding December 2015 only (and it was still
non significant). This suggests Jobs Act impact was too small to affect the estima-
tion of Law 190 incentives ITT. This result is in line with Sestito and Viviano (2016)
study. From it, it emerged that the effect of Jobs Act’s changements on permanent
contracts rules was negligible with respect to the effect of Law 190.
A third possible source of violation could be a change in the composition of
population study. To verify whether that was the case, we included in the regres-
sion model covariates on educational qualification and employment sector shares
and observed that the ITT estimation didn’t change significantly. Another possi-
ble source of bias was a changement in the share of unemployed in non-occupied
group happening at policy implementation time. To take into account of it, we in-
cluded in the regression model, a variable measuring the yearly rate of unemployed
among non-CICO-detected individuals and observed that this didn’t change ITT
estimation. The variable was built using RTFL data. The results of all the analysis
described in this section are presented in appendix E.
5 Conclusions
The previous analysis allows to make several considerations. Nevertheless, making
them, it is important to remember that the results of this analysis are only local,
given the method we used. The following conclusions should be attributed only to
the groups included in the analysis.
Law 407/90 had a significant and strong intention to treatment effect on eligi-
bles with approximately 24 months of unemployment. Indeed, its implementation
increase their likelihood to be hired by 36%. Additionally, the policy didn’t present
side effects as displacement effect and post-poned hirings effect. This is probably
due to the fact that employers prefer to hire the chosen workers immediately and
to italian firms characteristics.
A generalisation of the incentives to all unemployed would strongly penalise
the vulnerable group of LTU. Indeed, the intention-to-treatment effect of Law 190
parcel out of the component due to the limited implementation period of the policy
is non significant. This, and Centra and Gualtieri (2016) and Sestito and Viviano
(2016) results, suggest that the generalisation of the policy re-allocate the benefits
in favour of the other, more “desirable”, groups of unemployed. In order to be
effective, with respect to vulnerable groups of unemployed, a policy based on hiring
subsidies should lower their relative labour costs rather than their absolute ones.
This would avoid the benefits redistribution.
Thanks to the peak in hirings of LTU in December 2015, probably due to the
limited duration of the policy, Law 190 incentives had a positive and significant
effect on LTU hirings. Nontheless, the effect was considerably lower than Law
407/90 ones.
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A
Estimation for the Mezzogiorno Area
In the following are presented the results of the analysis reduced to the group of
individuals having the last working experience in a region of the Mezzogiorno Area.
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In table 7 the results of the estimations of treatment effect of Law 407/90 is reported
together with its value under different robustness checks. As mentioned before, the
estimation is fairly similar to the one obtained for Italy as a whole. Moreover, it is
robust to all checks. The selected bandwidth, in this analysis, was 718 to 740 days
of unemployment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
THRES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
24 4.72e-05*** 4.30e-05*** 2.73e-05*** 1.99e-05
(9.01e-06) (9.12e-06) (1.02e-05) (1.55e-05)
22 -4.64e-06
(8.10e-06)
26 -9.00e-06
(8.91e-06)
Obs 33,603 33,580 27,390 12,782 43,378 40,595
R-sq 0.068 0.071 0.093 0.192 0.059 0.078
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Law 407/90 ITT estimation and robustness check for the Mezzogiorno Area. Model
1: Standard. Model 2: Covariates addition. Model 3: Different bandwidth [722:736]. Model
4: Different bandwidth [726:732]. Model 5 and 6: Placebo Tests .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
THR Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
01/01/2015 -5.03e-03 -5.89e-03 -4.85e-03 -6.04e-03 -3.19e-03
(5.56e-03) (5.56e-03) (5.54e-03) (5.61e-03) (5.62e-03)
01/01/2014 -8.18e-04
(2.08e-03)
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 1,795 2,160 1,826
R-squared 0.085 0.086 0.090 0.096 0.102 0.040
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Generalised incentives ITT on vulnerable group estimation and checks for the
Mezzogiorno Area. Model 1: Standard. Model 2: Lagged GDP addition. Model 3: Foreign
Consumption addition. Model 4: Percentage of unemployed among non-CICO detected
addition. Model 5: Educational Level and Sector variables addition. Model 6: Placebo test.
Assumptions and robustness checks suggest the model is valid. The intention-
to-treatment effect of Law 407/90 is slightly higher in the Mezzogiorno area than
in the rest of Italy. Nevertheless, the Mezzogiorno area estimation presents a high
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volatility, hence the two coefficients are not significantly different. There is almost
no difference in terms of generalised incentives intention-to-treatment effect.
B
Comparison of the estimated averages of subsi-
dies amounts under the two policies
Given that the rules for the determination of benefit amount are well known and that
we had informations about employees’ wages, we were able to compare the amount
of subsidies given under the two laws. To do it, we used informations on wages to
estimate approximatively11 the tax credit amount given to each individual, hired
under Law 407/90, under the two policies. We compared the average value of the
estimated amounts each year. In theory, Law 407/90 should imply higher benefits,
since it covers both social security service and the amount due to the institution
providing work insurance, while Law 190 covers only the first. Nevertheless, the
rate of wage due to the institution providing work insurance is very low. Hence,
the difference may be negligible. Moreover, Law 407/90 covers 100% of the taxes
only for the Mezzogiorno area or for artisans firms, balancing even more the average
amount. The comparison is reported in table 9. As expected, the difference between
Year Avg 407 Avg 190 Diff /Avg 190
2010 7023 5726 0.227
2011 5816 5479 0.061
2012 5846 5502 0.063
2013 5722 5378 0.064
2014 6821 6366 0.071
Table 9: Comparison between estimated average subsidies under the two policies.
the average amount of subsidy given under each policy is negligible in most years.
Indeed, the difference is lower than 7.2% of the smallest average almost all years,
with the exception of 2010. For this reason observations relative to that year have
been excluded from the estimation.
C
Comparison of the distribution of treated and
controls among non-CICO-detected categories
In the following graph are represented the distributions, among different non-CICO-
detected categories, of individuals with 23 and individuals with 24 months of un-
employment. In order to build these distributions we used RTFL data. The last
11Where it is approximatively because the rate of wage the taxes have to be payed on, depends on the
type of work and the sector. Hence, we used an average value.
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is the result of a quarterly survey conducted by ISTAT (Italian National Institute
of Statistics) to provide informations on labour force conditions. It is one of the
most important database providing these informations and it is used to build official
estimations of labour force status. Data are collected every week interviewing more
than 250’000 families living in 1’100 different municipalities (Anastasia, Bertazzon,
et al. 2016).
The two distributions are fairly similair. Given the reduced amount of observations
with the required unemployment period we weren’t able to obtain the informations
for the exact groups used in the estimation. Nevertheless, given the methodology
we used to select the bandwidth, the difference in the distributions should be even
smaller in the selected groups.
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DPlacebo and Robustness Checks, Law 407/90
ITT Estimation
D.1 Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3)
THRESHOLD 2011-2014 2011-2014 2015
22 Months 9.87e-08
(4.86e-06)
26 Months -7.88e-06
(5.04e-06)
24 Months -9.60e-06
(1.28e-05)
Observations 42,369 42,369 11,315
R-squared 0.077 0.109 0.189
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Placebo Tests.
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D.2 Robustness Check with respect to Covariates Ad-
dition
VARIABLES Coefficients Std Error
α -1.43e-05 (1.416e-04)
Treatment (β1) 3e-05*** (4.59e-06)
Women % 8.64e-05 (8.27e-05)
Education % (Elementary baseline)
Low Secondary -5.48e-05 (9.44e-05)
Up Secondary 1.329e-04 (1.18e-03)
Tertiary no Univ -1.099e-03* (6.436e-04)
Tertiary Univ -4.33e-05 (1.215e-04)
Degree+ -1.252e-03** (5.514e-04)
1st Job Age (15-19 baseline)
20-24 -3.26e-05 (1.416e-04)
25-29 6.86e-05 (1.279e-04)
30-44 1.189e-04 (1.214e-04)
45+ -9.32e-05 (1.701e-04)
Foreigners -7.47e-05 (1.228e-04)
Sectors % (Agricolture baseline)
Industry 1.66e-04 (1.097e-04)
Constructions 3.128e-04*** (7.71e-05)
Services 4.8e-05 (6.52e-05)
Job Area % (NW baseline)
NE -1.104e-04 (1.085e-04)
Center 1.6e-05 (1.148e-04)
South and Islands 7.26e-05 (8.55e-05)
Observations 45,291
R-squared 0.096
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Robustness check: Covariates addition.
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D.3 Bandwidth Changes
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES [714:744] [720:740] [724:734]
Treat 3.01e-05*** 2.43e-05*** 2.21e-05***
(4.62e-06) (5.75e-06) (8.22e-06)
Observations 45,291 30,681 16,071
R-squared 0.094 0.124 0.204
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Bandwidth Changements.
Note that the different bandwidths we tested for, are all smaller than the chosen
bandwidth. Indeed, given the method we used in bandwidth selection, in a band-
width bigger than the chosen ones there wouldn’t be balance between treated and
controls. The estimation of treatment effect is not very sensitive to bandwidth
selection.
E
Placebo and Robustness Checks, Generalized
Policy ITT Estimation
E.1 Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAR Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Treat -6.74e-03 -6.37e-04 -7.29e-04 3.50e-05 3.70e-05 5.24e-05
(4.96e-03) (1.62e-03) (1.59e-03) (2.42e-04) (2.40e-04) (7.02e-05)
Obs 2,160 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826 1,826
R-sq 0.081 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Placebo Tests. Model 1: Standard. Model 2: January 1st 2014 as threshold.
Model 3: December 31st 2013 as threshold. Model 4: January 1st 2013 as threshold. Model
5: December 31st 2012 as threshold. Model 6: January 1st 2012 as threshold.
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E.2 Checking for other Exogenous Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VAR Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Treat -6.74e-03 -7.16e-03 -6.54e-03 -6.77e-03 -6.90e-03 -1.95e-03 -1.34e-04
(4.96e-03) (4.96e-03) (4.93e-03) (4.95e-03) (4.98e-03) (2.25e-03) (2.78e-04)
Obs 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 1,795 1,885 2,160
R-sq 0.087 0.087 0.094 0.089 0.097 0.059 0.111
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: Checking for other exogenous shocks. Model 1: Standard. Model 2: Lagged GDP
addition. Model 3: Foreign Consumption addition. Model 4: Lagged Foreign Consump-
tion addition. Model 5: Percentage of unemployed among non-CICO detected addition.
Model 6: Exclusion of observations relative to Jobs Act implementation months. Model 7:
Educational Level and Sector variable addition.
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